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The Scope of Section 1985 (3) in Light 
of Great American Federal Savings 
and Loan Association v. Novotny: 
Too Little Too Late? 
By TAUNYA LOVELL BANKS* 
Introduction 
After the close of the Civil War and the legal end of slavery, Con-
gress began to redefine the legal status of approximately four million 
newly emancipated blacks. At this time, most blacks resided in the 
eleven Southern states that comprised the Confederacy. 1 During the 
fall and winter of 1865-66, these states enacted so-called "Black Codes" 
which placed varying degrees of political, social, and economic restric-
tions on blacks. 2 In response to these codes, Congress enacted the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866.3 
Section 1 of the 1866 Act extended all rights of citizenship to for-
mer slaves.4 The Act also provided former slaves alleging discrimina-
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1. The confederate states were Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mis-
sissippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia. D. BELL, RAcE, 
RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 3-24 (2d ed. 1980); J.H. FRANKLIN, RECONSTRUCTION AFTER 
THE CML WAR passim (1961); Grossman, The Unhappy History o/ Civil Rights Legislation, 
50 MICH. L. REV. 1323, 1324-25 (1951). 
2. The Black Codes were designed generally to take the place of the defunct Slave 
Codes. The Black Codes differed slightly from the Slave Codes in that under the Black 
Codes, blacks were granted some rights: to own property, to make contracts, to sue and be 
sued, to legally marry, and to testify in court. Nevertheless, the Black Codes prohibited 
blacks from obtaining certain types of employment, possessing firearms, and joining the 
militia, and they often subjected blacks to vagrancy laws that were inapplicable to whites. B. 
QUARLES, THE NEGRO IN THE MAKING OF AMERICA 129-30 (1964). See also J. FRANK & R. 
MURRO, The Original Understanding o/ Equal Protection o/ the Laws, in ONE HUNDRED 
YEARS OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE 67 (1973). 
3. Ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866). 
4. ''That all persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign power, 
excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States; and 
[579] 
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tion access to federal courts. 5 Congress had based its authority for this 
legislation on the Thirteenth Am.endment;6 however, continuing doubts 
as to the Act's constitutionality prompted the Joint Committee on Re-
construction to recommend, in its April, 1866 report to Congress, the 
proposed Fourteenth Amendment.7 
During this period, several counter-Reconstruction organizations 
were formed in the South by reactionaries who believed that the Re-
construction efforts threatened the political and social structure of their 
states. 8 These organizations opposed equality between blacks and 
whites, often punishing "offenders" of either race. The most notorious 
group of counter-Reconstructionists was the Ku Klux Klan, which used 
a variety of techniques to preserve white supremacy, including threats, 
such citizens, of every race and color, without regard to any previous condition of slavery or 
involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been 
duly convicted, shall have the same right, in every State and Territory in the United States, 
to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, 
lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all 
laws and proceedings for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens, 
and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none other, any law, 
statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, to the contrary notwithstanding." Civil Rights Act 
of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27. 
5. "That the district courts of the United States, within their respective districts, shall 
have, exclusively of the courts of the several States, cognizance of all crimes and offenses 
committed against the provisions of this act, and also, concurrently with the circuit courts of 
the United States, of all causes, civil and criminal, affecting persons who are denied or can-
not enforce in the courts of judicial tribunals of the State or locality where they may be any 
of the rights secured to them by the first section of this act . . . ." I d. at § 3. 
6. "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime 
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any 
place subject to their jurisdiction." U.S. CoNST. amend. XIII, § 1. This amendment, 
adopted in February 1865 and ratified in December 1865, 13 Stat. 567, 774-75 (1865), simply 
extended to the entire country the principle of President Lincoln's proclamation of Septem-
ber 22, 1862. G. GUNTHER, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw 974 (lOth ed. 1980). 
7. See opening remarks of Senator Stevens in support of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2459 (1866). The proposed Fourteenth Amendment 
was adopted by Congress in June 1866 and was ratified by the states in 1868. 14 Stat. 358-59 
(1866); 15 Stat. 708-11 (1868). The Fifteenth Amendment was adopted in February 1869 
and was ratified in 1870 to secure the franchise for blacks and to preserve the rapidly disinte-
grating Republican Party in the South. 16 Stat. 1131-32 (1870). 
Section one of the Fourteenth Amendment reads as follows: "All persons born or natu-
ralized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United 
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, 
§1. 
8. L. BENNETT, JR., BEFORE THE MAYFLOWER 196-97 (1966); J.H. FRANKLIN, REcoN-
STRUCTION: AFTER THE CIVIL WAR 156-58 (1961); R. LOGAN, THE NEGRO IN THE UNITED 
STATES 27 (1957). 
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destruction of property, and physical violence. By the spring of 1867, 
the Klan had highly organized spin-offs in all the Southern states.9 
Congress subsequently enacted a series of laws, commonly referred to 
as the Force Acts, which were designed to enforce the provisions of the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. The first Force Act, the Civil 
Rights Act of 1870,10 was essentially a re-enactment of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1866, and was amended a year later by the second Force Act.U 
The third Force Act, known as the Ku Klux Act, 12 was directed at se-
cret and conspiratorial terrorist groups like the Klan. 13 Section 1 of 
that Act, now codified in part as 42 U.S.C. section 198~, provided civil 
remedies for interferences with federal rights ''under color" of law. 14 
Section 2, now codified as 42 U.S.C. section 1985(3), provided civil 
remedies for private conspiracies directed at interferences with federal 
rights. 15 
Both provisions of the Act lay dormant for almost ninety years, 16 
in part because of a series of Supreme Court cases that weakened the 
protection provided by these post-Civil War amendments and stat-
utesP The Court restricted the reach of these provisions, not only be-
9. J.H. FRANKLIN, supra note 8, at 156-58. 
10. Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140. 
11. Act of Feb. 28, 1871, ch. 99, 16 Stat. 433. 
12. Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13. 
13. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 568 (1871). 
14. "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or 
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United 
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privi-
leges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured 
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress." 42 U.S. C. § 1983 
(1976). 
15. "[If] two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in disguise on the 
highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indi-
rectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privi-
leges and immunities under the laws; ... the party so injured or deprived may have an 
action for the recovery of damages occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one 
or more of the conspirators." 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (Supp. III 1979). Although the language 
of the section has remained the same, it was codified in the 1970 United States Code as 
§ 1985(3), in the 1976 United States Code as § 1985(c), and in the 1979 Supplement to the 
United States Code as § 1985(3). This article will use the designation § 1985(3). 
16. Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651 (1951), was the first United States Supreme 
Court decision to interpret § 1985(3). The Court's conclusion that the statute reached only 
conspiracies conducted under state law in effect prohibited the use of§ 1985(3) to remedy 
private discrimination. This part of the Collins opinion was overruled in Griffin v. Brecken-
ridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971), which held that no state action was necessary to recover under 
§ 1985(3). 
17. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), held the public accommodations provi-
sion of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 unconstitutional because the Fourteenth Amendment 
does not apply to the wrongful acts of private individuals in the absence of some state sup-
HeinOnline -- 9 Hastings Const. L.Q. 582 1981-1982
582 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 9:579 
cause it felt the tremendous pressure exerted by Southern conservatives 
on the race question, but also because it was concerned about the extent 
to which the federal government should be allowed to regulate areas 
that traditionally rested within the states' domain. 18 The Court thus 
restricted what it felt to be excessive federal power in an attempt to 
balance the powers between the federal and state governments. In the 
last two decades, sections 1983 and 1985(3) have been reactivated by 
litigants combating racial and other class-based invidious discrimina-
tion, 19 who have found that the scope of protection and relief available 
under these statutes is often broader than that accorded by modem fed-
eral statutes such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964.20 The utility of sec-
tion 1985(3) was limited, however, by Great American Federal Savings 
& Loan Association v. Novotny,21 in which it was found that the scope 
of section 1985(3) is not coextensive with the scope of section 1983. 
port. See also Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565 (1896); Louisville, New Orleans and Tex. 
Ry. Co. v. Mississippi, 133 U.S. 587 (1890); Bush v. Kentucky, 107 U.S. 110 (1882); Neal v. 
Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1880); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1879); Strauder v. West 
Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879); Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485 (1877); The Slaughter-House 
Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). Except for the Slaughter-House Cases, all these deci-
sions were handed down after the 1877 Hayes/Tilden compromise which signaled the end of 
the Reconstruction era. For the effect of the 1877 compromise, see generally THE CML 
RIGHTS RECORD: BLACK AMERICA AND THE LAW 1849-1970, at 26 (R. Burdolph ed. 1970). 
See also D. BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 26-28 (2d ed. 1980). 
18. J.H. FRANKLIN, supra note 8, at 203-07. See also The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 
3, 18-19 (1883). 
19. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971), required that the conspiracy actionable 
under§ 1985(3) (I) involve "racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based. invidiously discrimi-
natory animus" behind the conspirator's action which is (2) "aim[ed] at a deprivation of the 
equal enjoyment of rights secured by the law to all." Id. at 102. Courts have found rights 
subject to protection under § 1985(3) to include: the right to vote, Means v. Wilson, 522 
F.2d 833 (8th Cir. 1973); the right to cast a ballot in a state election, Cameron v. Brock, 473 
F.2d 608 (6th Cir. 1973); the rights to worship and to assemble, Marlowe v. Fisher Body, 489 
F.2d 1057 (6th Cir. 1973) and Action v. Shannon, 450 F.2d 1227 (8th Cir. 1971) (en bane); 
the right to equal pay, Hodgin v. Jefferson, 447 F. Supp. 804 (D. Md. 1978); the right to file 
for bankruptcy, McLellan v. Mississippi Power & Light Co., 545 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1977) (en 
bane); the right to be free from state zoning law violations, Harrison v. Brooks, 446 F.2d 404 
(1st Cir. 1971); and the right to be free from state civil rights deprivations, Life Ins. Co. ofN. 
Am. v. Reichardt, 591 F.2d 499 (9th Cir. 1979). See also Note, 77te lf(fects of the Thirteenth 
Amendment on 42 U.S.C § 1985(c)-Fisher v. Shamburg, 12 ToLEDO L. REv. 959,973-74 
(1981). 
20. Civil Rights Act of·l964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 {1964), as amended by 
Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103-13 (1972), Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 375 (1972), Pub. L. 
No. 93-608, 88 Stat. 1972 (1975), Pub. L. No. 94-273, 90 Stat. 377 (1976) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). For example, under Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, litigants are not entitled to a jury trial, cannot seek punitive or full 
compensatory relief, and are bound by a statute of limitations that is shorter than those 
applicable to the older statutes. Great Am. Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 
366, 372-75 (1979). 
21. 442 u.s. 366 (1979). 
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In that case, respondent John R. Novotny, a loan officer and a 
member of the board of directors of Great American Federal Savings 
and Loan Association, alleged that the Association intentionally en-
gaged in a course of conduct the effect of which was to deny its women 
employees equal employment opportunity. Novotny was fired after he 
expressed support for the women employees at a board of directors 
meeting. He alleged that his employment was terminated because of 
his support for the women employees. Novotny filed a complaint with 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission under Title VII, 22 re-
ceived a right-to-sue letter,23 and sued the Association and its directors 
in district court. He claimed damages under section 1985(3), asserting 
that he had been injured as a result of a conspiracy to deprive him of 
equal protection and equal privileges and immunities under the laws. 
The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss on the grounds 
that the directors of a single corporation could not engage in a conspir-
acy, and thus section 1985(3) could not be invoked.24 On appeal, the 
Third Circuit, sitting en bane, unanimously reversed the district court. 
The court of appeals ruled, inter alia, that Title VII could be the source 
of a right asserted under section 1985(3)25 and that intracorporate con-
spiracies come within the intent of the section.26 
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Title VII cannot be 
used as the source of the substantive right asserted in an action under 
section 1985(3).27 The Court justified the difference in the scope of sec-
tions 1985(3) and 1983 by referring to the difference in statutory lan-
guage28 and by noting the inherent constitutional limitations on the 
authority of Congress to regulate purely private discrimination. 29 The 
majority opinion, however, failed to address the broader question: 
whether section 1985(3) can be used to remedy a violation of any fed-
eral statutory right. In concluding that section 1985(3), like section 
22. 42 U.S. C. § 2000e (1976). 
23. Id. at § 2000e-5(f)(l). 
24. Novotny v. Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 430 F. Supp. 227, 230 (W.D. Pa. 
1977). 
25. For a discussion of the debate surrounding the scope of protection provided by 
§ 1985(3), see Judge Adams' opinion, speaking for the Third Circuit Court of Appeal, en-
bane, Novotny v. Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n ~84 F.2d 1235, 1247-48 (3d Cir. 1978), 
and authorities cited therein. 
26. Id. at 1251-53. 
27. Novotny, 442 U.S. at 378. 
28. "§ 1 of the 1871 Act, the predecessor to § 1983, referred to 'rights, privileges, or 
immunities secured by the Constitution of the United States,' whereas § 2, the predecessor 
to§ 1985(3), referred to 'equal protection of the laws,' and 'equal privileges and immunities 
under the laws.'" I d. at 382 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
29. Id. at 383. 
HeinOnline -- 9 Hastings Const. L.Q. 584 1981-1982
584 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [VoL 9:579 
1983, is a remedial, rather than a substantive, statute,30 the majority 
opinion provides little, if any, insight into whether the substantive 
rights secured by section 1985(3) are limited to the rights secured by the 
Constitution31 or include rights created by statutes. This silence is sig-
nificant, given the concurring opinions by Justices Powell and Stevens, 
which posit that section 1985(3) does not redress any federal statutory 
right,32 and Justice White's dissenting opinion, which argues that sec-
tion 1985(3) "encompasses all rights guaranteed in federal statutes as 
well as those rights guaranteed directly by the Constitution.'m 
Section 1985(3), given a broad application, could be used as one of 
the few vehicles to combat purely private discrimination and to remedy 
the type of private invasions of individual rights complained of in the 
Civil Rights Cases. 34 Of course, for such a broad application of section 
1985(3) to withstand constitutional attack, the Court would have to de-
fine more clearly the "constitutional periphery"35 of section 1985(3) 
and to determine the extent of congressional authority to regulate 
purely private discrimination. Thus far the Court has refused to do so. 
This article discusses whether section 1985(3) creates a cause of 
action for violations of any federal statutory rights. Part I will examine 
the legislative history and statutory language of section 1985(3) to de-
termine whether Congress intended section 1985(3) to apply either as a 
remedial or as a substantive statute. Part II will explore the extent of 
congressional power to regulate private discrimination. The final part 
of this article will examine the positions of the present members of the 
30. Id. at 372. See notes 38-39 and accompanying text infra. 
31. But see Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980). In that case, respondents alleged 
that the State of Maine and its Commissioner of Human Services violated§ 1983 by depriv-
ing them of Aid to Families with Dependent Children benefits to which they were entitled 
under the Social Security Act. Again focusing on statutory language. the Court concluded 
that the phrase "and laws" in § 1983 "means what it says," that the plain language encom-
passed respondents' claim under the Social Security Act, and that§ 1983's remedy encom-
passes violations of federal statutory as well as constitutional law. I d. at 4-8. 
32. Justice Powell found that the reach of§ 1985(3) is limited to conspiracies to violate 
"those fundamental rights derived from the Constitution." Novotn;•, 442 U.S. at 379 (Pow-
ell, J ., concurring). 
Justice Stevens concluded that section 1985(3) was not "intended to provide a remedy 
for the violation of statutory rights-let alone rights created by statutes that had not yet been 
enacted [at the time of 1871] .... " Id. at 385 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
33. Id. at 389 n.5 (White, J., dissenting). 
34. 109 u.s. 3 (1883). 
35. This language comes from Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971), in which the 
Court held that the Thirteenth Amendment empowered Congress to legislate against pri-
vate, racially based conspiracies that interfered with the right to interstate travel, but refused 
to determine the "constitutionally permissible periphery" of§ 1985. I d. at 107. 
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Court in an attempt to predict how the Court might rule on future sec-
tion 1985(3) claims that allege deprivation of a federal statutory right. 
I. Section 1985(3): Remedial or Substantive? 
The majority in Novotny concluded that 1985(3) is a remedial stat-
ute and that an action under it must therefore be based on a conspiracy 
to violate some otherwise defined, independent federal substantive 
right to equal protection of the laws or of equal privileges and immuni-
ties under the laws. The majority opinion fails, however, to cite any 
authority in support of this conclusion.36 In his concurring opinion, 
Justice Stevens inferred that the legislative history of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1871 supports the majority's conclusion.37 In so doing, he 
quoted Senator Edmunds, the Senate manager of the bill,38 as say~g in 
the 1871 congressional debates that "[a]ll civil suits, as every lawyer 
understands, which this act authorizes, are not based upon it; they are 
based upon the right of the citizen. The act only gives a remedy."39 
Justice Stevens' analysis of the legislative history is misleading. 
First, this quotation is taken out of context. It was part of Senator Ed-
munds' remarks about section 6 of the 1871 Act,40 providing for an 
inquiry into the character and conduct of the persons who may be sum-
moned to sit on juries in cases arising under the Act.41 Furthermore, a 
review of Senator Edmunds' full comments on section 6 indicates that 
he was not concerned about the scope of the section, which is deline-
ated in section 2, but about a semantic technicality that would bar 
36. The Court merely asserted lhat § 1985(3) "creates no rights. It is a purely remedial 
statute, providing a civil cause of action when some olherwise defined federal right-to 
equal protection oflhe laws or equal privileges and immunities under lhe laws-is breached 
by a conspiracy in lhe manner defined by lhe section." 442 U.S. at 376 (emphasis in lhe 
original). 
37. Justice Stevens first cited Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600 
(1979), as holding lhat § 1983 is a remedial statute. He continued by quoting Senator Ed-
munds' comments as to lhe scope oflhe Act during lhe 1871 debates in such a manner as to 
imply lhat lhe authorities cited in Chapman are supportive of lhe majority's holding lhat 
§ 1985 is also remedial. 442 U.S. at 382 n.l (Stevens, J., concurring). 
38. The Sixlh Circuit Court of Appeals, in Browden v. Tipton, 630 F.2d 1149, 1151-52 
(6lh Cir. 1980), refers to Senator Edmunds as lhe floor manager oflhe bill. Senator George 
Edmunds, a Republican from Vermont, was one oflhe most outstanding radical New Eng-
land constitutionalists. His legal ability and integrity were well respected. J. FRANK & R. 
MURRO, supra note 2, at 81, 86. 
39. Novotny, 442 U.S. at 382 n.l (citing CoNG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 568 (1871) 
(remarks of Sen. Edmunds)). 
40. CoNG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 568 (1871) (remarks of Sen. Edmunds). 
41. Id. 
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plaintiffs who sued under the Act from challenging the jury.42 Specifi-
cally, he was explaining that an amendment to section 6 would enable 
the aggrieved party to challenge the jury and thereby insure a "pure 
and uncontaminated jury."43 
The point at which these statements appear is also significant. Be-
cause these statements pertain to section 6 of the Act, they cannot be 
indicative of the legislative intent of the scope of section 1985(3); it is 
section 2, not section 6, of the 1871 Act that is now codified as section 
1985(3). Senator Edmunds separately addressed section 2 during the 
1871 debate: 
The second section . . . only provides for the punishment of a 
conspiracy. It does not provide for the punishment of any act 
done in pursuance of the conspiracy, but only a conspiracy to 
deprive citizens of the United States, in the various ways named, 
of the rights which the Constitution and the laws of the United 
States made pursuant to it give to them; that is to say . . . con-
spiracies to deprive people of the equal protection of the laws, 
whatever those laws may be . . . . It punishes the conspiracy 
alone, leaving the States, if they see fit, to punish the acts and 
crimes which may be committed in pursuance of the 
conspiracy. 44 
These comments indicate that section 1985(3) was designed to create a 
separate and independent cause of action that would not preclude ex-
isting state remedies, but that would provide a right of action to anyone 
who was injured by the conspiracy alone. Furthermore, in response to 
Senator Edmunds, Senator Ames contended that the 1871 Act was un-
necessary because the states had adequate remedies to address the con-
cerns that gave rise to the 1871 Act.45 Because the 1871 Act was 
42. Id. After the comment quoted by Justice Stevens, Senator Edmunds had added, 
"This suit, therefore, in the technical sense, instead of being based upon the statute, as it 
would be if it were debt for a penalty, is a suit arising under the statute, and the consequence 
would be when you come to get before a judge and undertake to challenge a jury, without 
inserting the words 'arising under' the provisions of this act, as well as based upon it, any 
private patty would find himself debarred of having this inquiry made for his protection at 
all, and it would be only in criminal prosecutions based upon the provisions of the statute 
that this challenging of the jurors could occur. We thought it important, therefore, to use 
words which would enable a judge in all the cases of civil redress to see that the party 
aggrieved should have a pure and uncontaminated jury." I d. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. (emphasis added). 
45. Id. at 569-70 (remarks of Sen. Ames). Adelbert Ames, a federal general from 
Maine, served briefly as a United State Senator from Mississippi and as Mississippi's provi-
sional governor and military commander. V. WHARTON, THE NEGRO IN MISSISSIPPI 1865-
1890, at 138-39 (1965). Senator Ames' comments are given some significance when consid-
ered in light of Representative Fernando Wood's remarks. New York Representative 
Wood, by reading into the record letters from the individual Southern governors, indicated 
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enacted despite Senator Ames' contention, his remarks also support the 
notion that the 1871 Congress intended to create an independent sub-
stantive remedy for injuries not adequately redressed by existing state 
law. 
In order for the majority's conclusion in Novotny to withstand a 
logical analysis, state civil conspiracy actions would have had to exist 
as substantive rights prior to the Act. A brief survey of conspiracy laws 
in 1871 reveals, however, that an action for civil conspiracy was virtu-
ally unknown; formal recognition of such an action by a substantial 
number of states did not occur until the early part ofthe twentieth cen-
tury.46 Thus, conspiracy, as understood by the 1871 legislature, was 
criminal, not civil, in nature. Moreover, in 1871, even criminal conspir-
acy was viewed as a separate, substantive crime that did not merge with 
any crime perpetrated by the conspirators.47 Since modem civil con-
spiracy statutes are an outgrowth of the criminal conspiracy laws, Sena-
tor Edmunds' remarks evidence an intent by Congress to create a 
separate substantive federal civil conspiracy statute that was designed 
to punish, in his words, "a conspiracy to deprive citizens . . . of the 
rights which the Constitution and the laws of the United States made 
pursuant to it give to them ."48 Senator Edmunds' remarks indicate that 
Congress was mindful of the distinction between the conspiracy and 
any act done in pursuance thereof, and that state laws only provided 
remedies for injuries caused by the latter but not for injuries caused by 
the conspiracy itself. Thus, the conclusion in Novotny that section 
1985(3) creates only a remedy cannot be supported by legislative his-
tory; to the extent that civil conspiracy did not exist in 1871, the Civil 
Rights Act of 1871 created a new substantive federal right. 
In the seminal case of Gr!!fin v. Breckenridge,49 the Court never 
refers to section 1985(3) as a remedial statute-in fact, there is language 
in the unanimous opinion indicating the contrary. The Court declared 
the states' ability to handle any problems that might arise. He made this argument in an 
attempt to convince his fellow representatives that the 1871 Act was not needed. CoNG. 
GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 74 (1871) (remarks of Rep. Wood). 
46. See Burdick, Conspiracy as a Crime, and as a Tort, 7 CoLUM. L. REv. 229, 232 
(1907) (hereinafter cited as Burdick, Conspiracy as a Crime]; Burdick, The Tort of Conspir-
acy, 8 CoLUM. L. REv. 117 (1908); Charlesworth, Conspiracy as a Ground of Liability in 
Tort, 36 L. Q. REV. 38 (1920). Some states had a writ of conspiracy, but it was limited to 
providing a statutory remedy for malicious prosecution. Burdick, Conspiracy as a Crime, 
supra, at 232. See also Mott v. Danforth, 6 Watts 304 (Pa. 1837). 
47. Further, once civil conspiracy was recognized as an action, it was assumed to be 
substantive in nature. Burdick, Conspiracy as a Crime, supra note 46, at 229. 
48. CoNG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 568 (1871) (remarks of Sen. Edmunds) (empha-
sis added). 
49. 403 u.s. 88 (1971). 
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that section 1985(3) is not a general tort conspiracy statute, but rather is 
a federal tort law designed to punish conspiracies having some kind of 
invidious discriminatory animus.50 The abrupt51 and virtually unsup-
ported contention by the majority in Novotny that section 1985(3) is a 
remedial statute cannot be seen as anything other than a blatant at-
tempt by the Burger Court to limit access to the federal courts by re-
stricting the use of the post-Civil War civil.rights statutes. 
Perhaps the reasoning behind the Court's insistence on a remedial 
interpretation of section 1985(3), despite the questionable support of 
the legislative history of the 1871 Act, can be explained by examining 
two circuit court opinions interpreting the statute. 52 These lower courts 
claim that there is no constitutional basis for Congress' power to enact 
section 1985(3) as a substantive statute.53 Further, they contend that 
50. I d. at 101-02. Note also the language Justice Stevens used in his majority opinion in 
Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600 (1979). "Section 1985 of title 42, 
United States Code, often referred to as the Ku Klux Act, provides a civil remedy in dam-
ages to a person damaged as a result of conspiracies to deprive one of certain civil rights." 
Id. at 619 n.37 (citing H.R. REP. No. 291, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1957)). This revealing 
language does not appear either in the Novotny majority opinion or in Justice Stevens' con-
curring opinion. 
51. Until Novotny, the Supreme Court had not considered the scope of§ 1985(3) since 
Gr!ffin, eight years earlier. 
52. Bellamy v. Mason's Stores, Inc., 508 F.2d 504 (4th Cir. 1974): Dombrowski v. Dow-
ling, 459 F.2d 190 (7th Cir. 1972). See generally Note, The Scope of 1985(3) Since Griffin v. 
Breckenridge, 45 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 239 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Note, The Scope of 
1985(3)]. 
53. Dombrowski v. Dowling, 459 F.2d 190 (7th Cir. 1972), involved a § 1985(3) claim 
by a criminal attorney that a corporate landlord and its agents conspired arbitrarily and 
discriminatorily to deny him rental space because of the nature of his clientele. The Seventh 
Circuit, while recognizing that the "breadth of the statute's coverage is yet to be deter-
mined," id. at 195, found three categories of rights identified as protected under § 1985(3): 
the Thirteenth Amendment right to be free from the badges and incidents of slavery, the 
federal right to interstate travel, as identified by Gr!ffin, and the rights protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment. I d. Because the plaintiff did not claim discrimination based on 
the Thirteenth Amendment or the right to travel, the court addressed the effect of§ 1985(3) 
on private conspiracies to deprive rights protected under the Fourteenth Amendment. The 
court interpreted § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment as not empowering Congress to create 
additional substantive rights, thereby rendering§ 1985(3) remedial. The court reasoned that 
while § 1985(3) does not have the ''under color of' state law requirement, § 1983 does; that 
omission is "directed at the prosecuted conduct of the defendants rather than the nature of 
the plaintiffs' rights which are protected by the statute." Id. at 194. 
Recognizing that "Gr!ffin did not purport to delineate the scope of the rights secured by 
[1985(3)]," id., the court in .Dombrowski found the coverage of§§ 1983 and 1985(3) to be 
coextensive. It held that the type of protected interest covered by § 1983, ie ., deprivation of 
a right secured by the "Constitution and laws," must also be found in 1985(3) actions. I d. at 
194-96. 
In Bellamy v. Mason's Stores Inc., 508 F.2d 504 (4th Cir. 1974), the court held that 
§ 1985(3) gives no relief to a private employee who was fired as a result of his membership in 
the Ku Klux Klan. The court reasoned that because the language of the statute, which 
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the basic concept of federalism underlying the Court's reluctance in 
Gr!lfin to make section 1985(3) a general tort law justifies treating the 
statute as a remedial right. Since state civil conspiracy statutes are now 
common,54 applying 1985(3) as a substantive right could pose federal-
ism problems that were nonexistent at the time the 1871 Act was 
passed, namely, by creating federal tort actions that mirror state tort 
actions and thereby interfering with an area traditionally left to state 
jurisdiction.55 Given the current Court's deferential attitude regarding 
federal intervention,56 it is highly unlikely that a majority would be 
amenable to arguments contending that section 1985(3) is a substantive 
rather than a remedial right. The following section of this article will 
therefore examine the implications of section 1985(3) as a remedial 
statute. 
II. The Constitutional Periphery of Section 1985(3): The 
Extent to Which Congress Can Regulate Purely 
Private Discrimination 
In determining the type of interests that section 1985(3) may pro-
tect, it is significant that a year after Novotny was decided, the Court in 
Maine v. Thiboutot 57 held that section 1983 provides a remedy for all 
deprivations under color of state law of rights secured not only by the 
Constitution but also by federal statutes. 58 This interpretation of sec-
tion 1983 is supported by the plain language of the section, which is 
directed at state action resulting in "deprivation of any rights, privi-
protects against conspiracies to deny "equal protection of the laws" and "equal privileges 
and immunities under the laws," tracks the language of the Fourteenth Amendment, the 
statute requires state action-it does not create its own cause of action that can circumvent 
the state action requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court also refused to apply 
the First Amendment without this state action requirement. It reasoned that "the right of 
association derives from the first amendment-itself framed as a protection against the fed-
eral government and not against private persons . . . the incorporation doctrine has never 
been extended by the Supreme Court to extend to private persons." Id. at 506-07. 
54. A review of state laws indicates that civil conspiracy is recognized in most states 
either by statute or by common law as either a separate substantive tort or as a tort that 
merges with the tort that is the object of the conspiracy. 
55. See also Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651, 659 (1951), in which the Court feared 
that a broad interpretation of§ 1985(3) would raise grave constitutional questions concern-
ing the dilution of powers reserved to the states under the Tenth Amendment. 
56. A recent example of this attitude, in the context of Civil Rights litigation, is the 
Court's decision in Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), in which the Court found that the 
negligent loss of inmate property by prison officials was not cognizable under § 1983 if the 
state had an adequate judicial or administrative remedy to cover the loss. 
57. 448 U.S. I (1980). 
58. Id. at 4-8. 
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leges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws ."59 TlJ.e 
"under color of law" language of section 1983 has been construed to 
require some state action. Section 1985(3), on the other hand, contains 
no similar language. It is directed at private conspiracies to deprive 
individuals of "equal protection of the laws or of equal privileges and 
immunities under the laws."60 
The question arises whether or not the statutory language in sec-
tion 1985(3) provides for the same broad remedial powers as does sec-
tion 1983. To determine the extent to which section 1985(3) can be 
used to remedy injuries from violations of federal statutory rights, the 
source of the congressional power to regulate purely private discrimi-
nation must first be examined. 
A. The Fourteenth Amendment as the Source for Congressional 
Regulation of Private Discrimination 
The legislative history of the 1871 Act cites the Fourteenth 
Amendment as the basis for congressional authority to regulate private 
discrimination.61 Supreme Court decisions immediately following the 
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, however, substantially emas-
culated the scope of the Amendment by interpreting it to authorize 
only congressional legislation addressing state action and, conse-
quently, left the modem Court with a questionable constitutional basis 
for section 1985(3).62 
The Court in the Civil Rights Cases63 suggested that there might be 
some constitutional basis for congressional regulation of purely private 
discrimination.64 Nevertheless, it found that the Fourteenth Amend-
59. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) (emphasis added). 
60. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (Supp. III 1979). 
61. CoNG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 335 (1871). 
62. See note 17 supra. See also F. BIDDLE, Civil Rights and the Federal Law, in SAFE-
GUARDING CIVIL LIBERTY TODAY 109, 116 (1945); C. MANGUM, THE LEGAL STATUS OF 
THE NEGRO 26-27 (1940); J. TENBROEK, THE ANTI-SLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT 163 (1951); H.D. Hamilton, The Legislative and Judicial History of the Thir-
teenth Amendment, 9 NAT'L B. J. 26, 61-62 (1951). 
63. 109 u.s. 3 (1883). 
64. The Court queried, "Can the act of a mere individual, the owner of the inn, the 
public conveyance, or place of amusement, refusing the accommodation, be justly regarded 
as imposing any badge of slavery or servitude upon the applicant, or only as inflicting an 
ordinary civil injury, properly cognizable by the laws of the State, and presumably subject to 
redress by those laws until the contrary appears?" Id. at 24. It further stated, "[W]e are 
forced to the conclusion that such an act of refusal has nothing to do with slavery or invol-
untary servitude, and that if it is violative of any right of the party, his redress is to be sought 
under the laws of the State; or if those laws are adverse to his rights and do not protect him, 
his remedy will be found in the corrective legislation which Congress has adopted, or may 
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ment did not provide such a basis, because section 5 of the Amendment 
limited congressional lawmaking powers to legislation designed solely 
to remedy state discriminatory action. 65 Eighty-three years later, in 
United States v. Guest, 66 the Court said that in order to create rights 
under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, state 
involvement need not be direct.67 Six justices in Guest believed in va-
rying degrees that section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment could be the 
basis for legislation regulating private discrimination. 68 
Thus, in Collins v. Hardyman,69 the Court, relying on the reason-
ing of the Civil Rights Cases10 that a private person cannot deprive an-
other of "equal protection of the laws,'m required some state action 
before a section 1985(3) suit could be maintain~d.72 Consequently, in 
Gr!ffin v. Breckenridge,13 which overruled the requirement of Hardy-
adopt, for counteracting the effect of State laws, or State action prohibited by the Fourteenth 
Amendment." Id. · 
65. "It is State action of a particular character that is prohibited. Individual invasion of 
individual rights is not the subject-matter of the amendment. . . . It nullifies and makes 
void all State legislation, and State action of every kind, which impairs the privileges and 
immunities of citizens of the United States . . . . [T]he last section of the amendment in-
vests Congress with power to enforce it by appropriate legislation. To enforce what? To 
enforce the prohibition. To adopt appropriate legislation for correcting the effects of such 
prohibited State laws and State acts, and thus to render them effectually null, void, and 
innocuous. This is the legislative power conferred upon Congress, and this is the whole of it. 
It does not invest Congress with power to legislate upon subjects which are within the do-
main of State legislation; but to provide modes of relief against State legislation, or State 
action, of the kind referred to. It does not authorize Congress to create a code of municipal 
law for the regulation of private rights; but to provide modes of redress against the operation 
of State laws, and the action of State officers executive or judicial, when these are subversive 
of the fundamental rights specified in the amendment." I d. at 11. 
66. 383 u.s. 745 (1966). 
67. Id. at 755-56. See also United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 795-96 (1966); United 
States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 70 (1951). 
68. "[T]here now can be no doubt that the specific language of§ 5 empowers the Con-
gress to enact laws punishing all conspiracies-with or without state action-that interfere 
with Fourteenth Amendment rights." 383 U.S. at 762 (Clark, J., concurring). "I can find no 
principle of federalism nor word of the Constitution that denies Congress power to deter-
mine that in order adequately to protect the right to equal utilization of state facilities, it is 
also appropriate to punish other individuals-not state officers themselves and not acting in 
concert with state officers-who engage in the same brutal conduct for the same misguided 
purpose." Id. at 784 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
69. 341 u.s. 651 (1951). 
"70. 109 u.s. 3 (1883). 
71. Id. at 17. 
72. 341 U.S. at 661. 
73. 403 U.S. 88 (1971). In Gr!f!in, black citizens of Mississippi filed a damages action 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), charging that respondents, white citizens of Mississippi, had con-
spired to assault petitioners and to prevent them, through force, violence, and intimidation, 
from freely traveling upon federal, state, and local highways. The Court held that§ 1985(3) 
does not require state action but reaches private conspiracies that are aimed at invidiously 
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man that a section 1985(3) suit requires state action, the Court was 
forced to find other constitutional sources-the Thirteenth Amendment 
and the right to travel-to justify congressional regulation of private 
discrimination. 
The Court in Gr!ffin did not consider the scope of congressional 
power under section 5 when it discussed the constitutional basis of sec-
tion 1985(3), and the Fourteenth Amendment has not been ruled out as 
a constitutional basis for a section 1985(3) claim. To require state ac-
tion under section 1985(3), however, would merely duplicate the pro-
tections already available under section 1983. Nonetheless, there is 
some lower court authority and language in Novotn.y74 and in lower 
court decisions75 to support the notion that some state connection must 
be shown before section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment can be used 
successfully as a constitutional basis for attacking private 
discrimination. 
A resolution of the state action requirement is necessary in order 
to determine the type of federal statute section 1985(3) may remedy 
pursuant to section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Stevens, 
in his concurring opinion in Novotny, suggested that the degree of state 
involvement is something less than traditional state action and does not 
have to be part of the conspiracy itself.76 Circuit court decisions are 
discriminatory deprivation of the equal enjoyment of rights secured to all by law. 403 U.S. 
at 95-103. 
74. 442 U.S. at 384 (1979) (Stevens, J., concurring). The majority opinion did not have 
to reach the issue of state action because it found that the completeness of the Title VII 
statutory scheme precluded § 1985(3) from providing a remedy. Justice Stevens argued, 
however, that the section does not provide a remedy for any federal statutory right. He used 
the state action requirement to bolster his argument: "[R]equirement of state action, in this 
context, is more than a requirement that there be a constitutional violation." Id. at 385 
(Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens cited Dombrowski v. Dowling, 459 F.2d 190 (7th 
Cir. 1972), and Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), to support his position that litigants 
under 1985(3) must show some state connection before recovering for a private violation of 
the right to equal protection. For a full discussion of this question, see Note, The Scope of 
1985(3), supra note 52. See also Cohen v. Illinois lnst. of Technology, 524 F.2d 818, 829-30 
(7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 943 (1976); Murphy v. Mt. Carmel High School 543 
F.2d 1189 (7th Cir. 1976). 
75. Doski v. M. Goldseker Co., 539 F.2d 1326, 1333 (4th Cir. 1976); Cohen v. Illinois 
Inst. of Technology, 524 F.2d 818, 828 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied. 425 U.S. 943 (1976); 
Lopez v. Arrowhead Ranches, 523 F.2d 924, 927 n.2 (9th Cir. 1975); Bellamy v. Mason's 
Stores, Inc., 508 F.2d 504, 507 (4th Cir. 1974); Sykes v. California, 497 F.2d 197, 200 (9th 
Cir. 1974); Dombrowski v. Dowling, 459 F.2d 190, 196 (7th Cir. 1972). 
76. 442 U.S. at 384-85 (Stevens, J., concurring). Note also that Justice Stevens con-
ceded that no state involvement is required for private conspiracies to deprive individuals of 
either their right to travel or their right to be free of badges and incidents of slavery, but 
argued that recovery for equal protection violations occurs only when state action is present. 
Id. at 383-85. 
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split on both the degree and the nature of state action required. The 
Seventh Circuit, for instance, takes Justice Stevens' position. In Dom-
browski v. Dowling,17 that court agreed that some state action is re-
quired before a section 1985(3) claim of deprivation of a right protected 
by the Fourteenth Amendment may be brought. The degree of state 
involvement that court thought necessary before an action under sec-
tion 1985(3) based on section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment could be 
maintained stopped short of state action and seemed to go to the nature 
of the right asserted. 78 
Two other views have been expressed by the federal courts. The 
Fourth Circuit requires traditional state action/9 but the Fifth and 
Eighth Circuits do not. Instead, these latter two courts read Griffin as 
construing section 1985(3) to reach both public and private depriva-
tions of constitutional rights. The Fifth Circuit finds that a deprivation 
of equal protection by private persons occurs not as a result of state 
action, but where there has been a conspiracy to "deprive another of 
the enjoyment of legal rights by independently unlawful conduct."80 
The Eighth Circuit holds that the Fourteenth Amendment protects cer-
taip rights from both state and private infringement. 81 The Eighth Cir-
77. 459 F.2d 190 (7th Cir. 1972). 
78. For example, Justice Stevens (then a member of the Court of Appeals for the Sev-
enth Circuit) in two separate opinions wrote of the type of state involvement required under 
1985(3): "For there is no statutory requirement for state participation or support for the 
conduct of the individual conspirators proscribed by 1985(3). There is, however, a require-
ment that the conspiracy deprive the plaintiff of a federally protected right." Cohen v. llli-
nois lnst. of Technology, 524 F.2d 818, 828 (1975). "It is clear that a private conspiracy to 
cause the plaintiff to receive unequal treatment from the state, or a state agency, would · 
violate 1985(3)." Id. at 828 n.27 (citing United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966)). Three 
years earlier, in Dombrowski, Justice Stevens wrote that the state involvement required 
under 1985(3) goes to the "nature of the plaintifi's rights" being asserted since only some 
rights are protected from state infringement. 459 F.2d 190, 194 (1972). 
79. Doski v. M. Goldseker Co., 539 F.2d 1326 (4th Cir. 1976); Bellamy v. Mason's 
Stores, Inc., 508 F.2d 504 (4th Cir. 1974). 
80. Scott v. Moore, 640 F.2d 708, 717-18 (5th Cir. 1981). See also McLellan v. Missis-
sippi Power & Light Co., 545 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1977) (en bane). In McLellan, the court 
considered whether or not § 1985(3) could provide relief for the plaintiff's claim that he was 
discharged from his job because he sought voluntary bankruptcy. The court, in construing 
the "equal protection of the laws" language in the section, found that a private person could 
deprive another of"equal protection of the laws" only when the defendant acted in violation 
of a state or federal provision. I d. at 927. Finding that it was not unlawful to terminate 
employment of an employee on the ground that he ffied for bankruptcy, the court denied 
relief under§ 1985(3). I d. at 933. See also Britt v. Suckle, 453 F. Supp. 987, 1001-02 (E.D. 
Tex. 1978), in which the plaintiffs claimed that their employer and others oonspired to pre-
vent them from pursuing legal action to vindicate their rights, and the court found the action 
cognizable under § 1985(3). 
81. Action v. Gannon, 450 F.2d 1227 (8th Cir. 1971). Action involved a suit by church 
members to enjoin picketing and other protest actions by members of the Black Liberation 
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cuit cases, however, are limited to instances in which the substantive 
right asserted is a fundamental constitutional right. 
Adoption of the Fifth Circuit's view would allow the broadest ap-
plication of section 1985(3) as a remedial provision because the re-
quirement of state involvement would be satisfied by showing that the 
object of the conspiracy was the deprivation of some federal or state 
law. Thus, if the intent of the conspiracy· was to deny the litigant some 
legal right provided by federal or state law due to some invidious class-
based animus, 82 it would be a denial of equal protection of the laws as 
required by section 1985(3). This view would be consistent with the 
legislative background of the Ku Klux Act, because at the time section 
1985(3) was enacted, Congress felt that the Southern states' govern-
ments were either unwilling or unable to protect the rights of black 
citizens adequately.83 If a state fails to provide the litigant or his class 
with rights and remedies available to other citizens and if the alleged 
discriminatory action violates a federal statutory right, then, using the 
Fifth Circuit's rationale, section 1985(3) could be used successfully to 
challenge such action. Although this interpretation would place a 
heavy burden of proof on the litigant, it conceivably would allow the 
litigant to use ·a federal statute as the substantive basis of a section 
1985(3) action, provided that the litigant could show that the federal 
statute was designed to protect rights that Congress felt states either 
could not or would not adequately protect. As the language in Novotny 
and Thiboutot suggests, however, only federal statutes that do not have 
Front because the protest activities interfered with church services. Relying on the Four-
teenth Amendment as a constitutional basis for vindicating the deprivation of church mem-
bers' First Amendment rights by a private conspiracy, the court found that § 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment empowers Congress "to enforce rights guaranteed by the Amend-
ment against private conspiracies." Id. at 1235. The court also found that its notion of the 
scope of§ 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment is consistent with United States v. Guest, 383 
U.S. 745 (1966), in that it does not necessarily require state action. See note 68 supra. The 
court also found its notion consistent with the Supreme Court's "expansion of the concept of 
state action." 450 F.2d at 1236 (citing Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 229 (1969), and 
United States v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 563 (1968)). Four years later, in Means v. Wilson, 522 
F.2d 833 (8th Cir. 1975), the Eighth Circuit added the right to vote in tribal elections to those 
types of interferences by private individuals that constitute a denial of equal privileges and 
immunities under § 1985(3). Means involved a candidate for tribal council president who 
alleged that certain election irregularities deprived the plaintiff and others of their right to a 
fundamentally fair election. The Eighth Circuit cited a Sixth Circuit case, Cameron v. 
Brock, 473 F.2d 610 (6th Cir. 1973), as holding that § 1985(3) protected the right to vote 
against private conspiracies. 
82. It is clear from the cases that § 1985(3) requires the litigant to show some class-
based invidiously discriminatory motive for the conspiracy. Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan 
Ass'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 370-78 (1979), and cases cited therein. 
83. See notes 1-15 and accompanying text supra. 
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their own separate enforcement provisions can be used as the substan-
tive basis of an action brought under the remedial statutes of the 1871 
Act. 84 Therefore, even if one successfully argued that section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment provides a constitutional basis for section 
1985(3), the litigant still faces two major hurdles: showing &orne state 
involvement, however defined, and finding a substantive federal statute 
without a built-in remedial scheme. 85 
B. The Thirteenth Amendment as a Constitutional Basis 
Given the state action requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
the Thirteenth Amendment would, at first blush, seem to permit a 
broader application of section 1985(3); however, relying on the Thir-
teenth Amendment as a constitutional source will limit the type of dis-
crimination to that which is racially motivated. Since the Thirteenth 
Amendment itself makes slavery illegal, any statute prohibiting some 
activity as a badge or incident of slavery can be remedied under section 
1985(3). The inquiry under the Thirteenth Amendment, therefore, is 
what acts constitute badges and incidents of slavery. 
In the Civil Rights Cases, the Court conceded that Congress might 
have the power under the Thirteenth Amendment to regulate private 
acts if those acts in some way constituted badges or incidents of slav-
ery.86 The Court, however, failed to define what these acts were, indi-
cating only that mere discrimination on the basis of race or color was 
not considered a badge of slavery.87 Eighty-five years later, in deter-
mining whether or not Congress had the power under section 198288 to 
prohibit all racial discrimination, public and private, in the sale or 
rental of property, the Court held that Congress has the power to deter-
mine what constitutes badges or incidents of slavery and to pass any 
laws necessary to eliminate those badges or incidents. 89 
84. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 2-8 (1980); Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. 
Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 370-78 (1979). 
85. The class protected under the Fourteenth Amendment would include all persons 
discriminated against in such a way as to deprive them of equal protection. 
86. 109 U.S. at 20. 
87. Id. at 25. 
88. "All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and Terri-
tory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey 
real and personal property." 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1976). 
89. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968). Justices Harlan and White both 
dissented, claiming that the history of the Thirteenth Amendment does not clearly indicate 
that Congress has the power to reach purely private discrimination. Id. at 473. See also 
Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 prohibits private, 
commercially operated nonsectarian schools from denying admission to blacks); Sullivan v. 
Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969) (white person expelled from a nonstock corpo-
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Although the Court in Gr!f!in found that the Thirteenth Amend-
ment provides one constitutional basis for a section 1985(3) action,90 
reliance on the Thirteenth Amendment places limitations both on the 
persons to whom section 1985(3) relief would be available and on the 
nature of rights that could be remedied under section 1985(3). The 
scope of the Thirteenth Amendment has never been squarely addressed 
by the Court, but that Amendment clearly does not protect all individ-
uals against all forms of discrimination,91 and a~ost certainly not the 
gender-based discrimination at issue in Novotny. In addition, the fed-
eral statutory right to be remedied would have to be one that Congress 
had determined was necessary to eliminate badges or incidents of 
slavery.92 
This determination may be limited by First Amendment privacy 
and right to association concerns. For example, in Runyon v. Mc-
Crary ,93 the Court held that racially discriminatory admissions policies 
of private, commercially operated nonsectarian schools violate section 
1981,94 which prohibits racial discrimination in the making and enforc-
ing of private contracts. In ruling that the application of section 1981 
does not abridge the parents' constitutional rights of free association 
ration community recreational association because he assigned his membership share to a 
black allowed to sue under § 1982). 
90. 403 U.S. at 105. 
91. Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 470 (1973). But see McDonald v. Santa Fe 
Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976), which held that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 applies to white 
victims of discrimination in private employment. I d. at 295-96. The Court noted, "[T]he 
congressional design to protect individuals of all races is further emphasized by re-enact-
ment of the 1866 Act as part of the Enforcement Act of 1870, following ratification of the 
Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 289 n.l9. 
92. This limitation on the scope of the Thirteenth Amendment could be avoided if the 
Court decided that the self-executing nature of§ 1 of the Thirteenth Amendment is capable 
of providing a remedy in the absence of congressional legislation defining involuntary servi-
tude. Arguably, the self-executing force of§ 1 of the Thirteenth Amendment is as extensive 
as the power of Congress under § 2 to enforce the Amendment by appropriate legislation. 
Note, Federal Power to Regulate Private Discrimination: The Reviral of the Enforcement 
Clauses of the Reconstruction Era Amendments, 14 CoLUM. L. REv. 449, 499 (1974). In the 
Civil Rights Cases, the Court acknowledged the self-executing force of the Amendment, 
declaring the Amendment's prohibitions "undoubtedly self-executing." 109 U.S. at 20. 
Even assuming this to be the case, the Court has invoked its power under § 1 of the Thir-
teenth Amendment in only a limited number of instances, specifically those cases involving 
involuntary slavery. Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4 (1944); Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 
(1911). Furthermore, the Court has expressed its hesitancy to declare new laws pursuant to 
§ I of the Thirteenth Amendment as it ''would grant it a lawmaking power far beyond the 
imagination of the Amendment's authors." Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217,227 (1971). 
The Court has preferred to leave the task of defining the badges and incidents of slavery to 
Congress. · 
93. 427 u.s. 160 (1976). 
94. See note 89 supra. 
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and privacy, the Court noted that no governmental intrusion into the 
privacy of the home or "similarly intimate setting" was involved, be-
cause the private schools appealed to a public constituency.95 This 
holding implies that, absent a finding of some public character to the 
alleged private discriminatory act, Thirteenth Amendment considera-
tions must give way to competing constitutional considerations.96 
Dicta in several cases indicate that there is a constitutional right to 
discriminate when competing rights are involved.97 When discrimina-
tory acts occur in purely private settings, the Court must determine 
whether or not a governmental interest is sufficiently compelling to 
override the right to discriminate.98 It is doubtful that the Court will 
find a sufficiently compelling governmental interest to override the 
right of the individual to discriminate in such purely private settings as 
the home. The difficulty in distinguishing between purely private acts 
and acts characterized as private but with a public character perhaps 
explains the Court's reluctance to determine the constitutional periph-
ery of section 1985(3).99 Nevertheless, it does not appear that First 
Amendment privacy and right to association concerns will be major 
obstacles to section 1985(3) actions relying on the Thirteenth Amend-
ment. Most right to privacy decisions have involved extremely per-
95. 427 U.S. at 170 n.IO, 178. 
96. Id. at 186 (Powell, J., concurring), 189 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
97. In Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455,463,469-70 (1973), the Court indicated that, 
in some circumstances, private racial discrimination might be characterized as an exercise of 
freedom of association and therefore be protected by the First Amendment. See also Moose 
Lodge No. 107 v. lrvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 298-301 (1966); 
Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 313 (1964). For a general discussion of the right of associa-
tion as a constitutional right to discrimination, see Note, supra note 92, at 520-24; Note, 
Section 1981 and Private Groups: The Right to .Discriminate Versus Freedom From .Discrimi-
nation, 84 YALE L.J. 1441, 1455-64 (1975). 
98. This balancing-of-interests formula is reminiscent of the compelling state interest 
test in equal protection cases, see, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634-38 (1969), 
and probably involves similar problems in application. For a criticism of the compelling 
state interest test in equal protection cases, see Gunther, Foreword: In Search o/ Evolving 
.Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1 
(1972). 
99. See text accompanying note 95 supra. This reluctance also extends to Fourteenth 
. Amendment cases. The Burger Court continues to cite the Civil Rights Cases for the propo-
sition that the Fourteenth Amendment's self-executing impact extends only to state action 
and consequently does not reach private discrimination, even though notions of what consti-
tutes state action have expanded considerably since 1883. See, e.g., Adickes v. S.H. Kress & 
Co., 398 U.S. 229 (1969); United States v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 563 (1968). Nevertheless, the 
Court has yet to hold that the Fourteenth Amendment mandates social, as opposed to polit-
ical, equality between racial minorities and the majority race. It is doubtful that the Court 
ever will, because of the difficulties inherent in any attempt by government at prosecuting 
social morality. 
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sonal invasions of the body, 100 marital relations, 101 or solitude of the 
home, 102 and it is doubtful that these types of privacy allegations could 
be successfully used to challenge invidiously discriminatory private 
conspiracies. Further, although the Court in Runyon suggested that 
any associational rights protected by the First Amendment are 
designed to promote "the advancement of beliefs and ideas," it recog-
nized that invidiously discriminatory private practices are not afforded 
"affirmative constitutional protections. And even some private dis-
crimination is subject to special remedial legislation in certain circum-
stances under section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment .... " 103 
A litigant relying upon the Thirteenth Amendment as the constitu-
tional basis of a section 1985(3) action therefore must plead and prove 
that the alleged discrimination was not purely private and that it vio-
lated a statute which Congress enacted to eliminate badges or incidents 
of slavery. The language of the Thiboutot and Novotny opinions sug-
gests, however, that even if such a statute were found, an action under 
section 1985(3) would still be foreclosed if the statute had its own en-
forcement provisions. 104 Finding a substantive federal statute that was 
intended to eliminate badges or incidents of slavery and is without its 
own enforcement provisions may be an impossible task. 
C. Other Sources: The Rights and Privileges of National Citizenship 
The Court in Gr!lftn also referred to the constitutionally protected 
right of interstate travel as one of the "rights and privileges ofNational 
citizenship" that is "assertable against private as well as governmental 
interference. . . . That right, like other rights of National citizenship, 
is within the power of Congress to protect by appropriate legisla-
tion."105 Despite these promising statements, the Court has been reluc-
tant to define, with any degree of clarity, what rights are included 
under national citizenship and whether or not any or all of such rights 
are protected from interferences both by government and by private 
individuals. 106 Arguably, congressional power to protect these rights of 
national citizenship includes the authority to determine what these 
100. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
101. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut; 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
102. See, e.g., Rowan v. Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1970). 
103. 427 U.S. at 175-76 (citing NAACP v. Alabama ex rei. Patterson, 354 U.S. 449,460 
(1958)). 
104. See note 84 and accompanying text supra. 
105. 403 U.S. at 105-06. 
106. See Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908). Note that reliance on this constitu-
tional provision would preclude aliens from suing under § 1985(3). In the past, aliens have 
used other Reconstruction era civil rights statutes to protect their rights. See Fiallo v. Bell, 
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rights are. If Congress has this authority, then it creates another right 
or privilege of national citizenship whenever it enacts legislation 
designed to provide statutory rights for citizens. Thus, the interference 
with these statutory rights by private individuals would be actionable 
under section 1985(3), provided that the litigant can show some invidi-
ously discriminatory class-based animus. It is doubtful, however, that 
the Court would be receptive to this argument, since it would greatly 
broaden the scope of section 1985(3). 107 The recent trend in federal 
courts has been to restrict the scope of section 1983;108 it is highly un-
likely that the Supreme Court will interpret the scope of section 1985(3) 
in a manner inconsistent with this trend. 
lll. The Future of Section 1985(3): Positions of the Present 
Members of the Court 
It appears that the development of section 1985(3) will be circum-
scribed by the development of section 1983. First, sections 1983 and 
1985(3) are both modem-day codifications of the 1871 Civil Rights Act 
and thus have common historical ties. Second, the Court's perceived 
problems caused by an expansive interpretation of the scope of section 
1983 will surely influence it in developing the scope of section 
1985(3). 109 A study of the Burger Court's treatment of section 1983 
actions is thus critical in predicting future section 1985(3) decisions. By 
examining the opinions in two section 1983 cases, Chapman v. Houston 
Welfare Rights Organization 110 and Maine v. Thiboutot, 111 as well as 
the opinions in Novotny, it is possible to predict what the positions of 
the present Supreme Court justices will be if directly confronted with 
determining the constitutional periphery of section 1985(3). 
430 U.S. 787 (1977); Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 
u.s. 67 (1976). 
107. Similarly, Justice White's suggestion in his dissenting opinion in Novotny that the 
commerce clause provides a constitutional basis for a § 1985(3) action to remedy invidiously 
discriminatory conspiracies to deny Title VII rights, 442 U.S. at 396 n.20, will probably not 
be embraced by the Court because it would provide an expansive use of§ 1985(3). Use of 
the commerce clause would give broader application to§ 1985(3) than either the Thirteenth 
or Fourteenth Amendments because it would not require state action and it would apply to 
discriniination based on something other than race. Finally, use of the commerce clause as a 
basis for a§ 1985(3) action would be inconsistent with the 1871 Congress' understanding of 
that clause. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 253-58 (1964). 
108. For a discussion of the Court's dissatisfaction with § 1983 actions, see generally 
Whitman, Constitutional Torts, 79 MICH. L. REv. 5 (1980). 
109. Novotny, 442 U.S. at 382-83 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
110. 441 u.s. 600 (1979). 
Ill. 448 U.S. 1 (1980). 
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In Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization, the Supreme 
Court held that jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. subsections 1343(3) and 
(4)112 does not encompass a claim that a state welfare regulation is in-
valid because it conflicts with the federal Social Security Act. Chap-
man involved two cases challenging the actions of state officials and 
regulations that allegedly violated provisions of the Social Security Act. 
The petitioner in one action brought suit in federal district court under 
section 1983, c1airning that New Jersey officials, by denying her emer-
gency assistance funds because she was not "in a state of homelessness" 
as required by the relevant New Jersey regulations, 113 had deprived her 
of a right to such assistance "necessary to avoid destitution" within the 
meaning of section 406(c)(l) of the federal Social Security Act. 114 In 
the other action, respondents, recipients of Aid to Families with De-
pendent Children (AFDC) who shared living quarters with a nonde-
pendent relative, brought a class action in federal district court, 
claiming that Texas regulations requiring that AFDC benefits be re-
duced to recipients with such living arrangements violated section 
402(a)(7) of the Social Security Act115 and the federal regulations 
promulgated pursuant thereto. 116 
Although the Court in Chapman avoided a specific pronounce-
ment on the extent to which section 1983 covers violations of federal 
statutes, the four separate opinions in the case provide some clues. Jus-
tice Stevens, writing for the majority but joined only by Justice Black-
mun, took the most restrictive view of the scope of section 1983. He 
argued that section 1983 was intended to apply only to those federal 
statutes designed to enforce Fourteenth Amendment guarantees. 117 
Further, he contended that it is preferable to limit section 1983 to the 
federal statutes that are designed to insure equal rights and that are 
comparable in nature to the Civil Rights Act of 1866. He concluded 
that a federal district court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the 
112. "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by 
law to be commenced by any person ... (3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any 
State law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immu-
nity secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing 
for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States; 
(4) to recover damages or to secure equitable or other relief under any Act of Congress 
providing for the protection of civil rights, including the right to vote." 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3)-
(4) (1976). 
113. N.J. ADMIN. CODE 10:82-5.12 (1969) (current version at N.J. ADMIN. CODE 10:82-
5.10 (1977)). 
114. 42 U.S.C. § 606(e)(1) (1976). 
115. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7) (1976). 
116. 45 C.F.R. §§ 233.20(a)(3)(ii)(C), 233.90(a) (1974). 
117. 441 U.S. at 615-18. 
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claim. 118 
Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehn-
quist, wrote a concurring opinion. After an exhaustive review of the 
legislative history of section 1983, including the work of the commis-
sioners who drafted the revised statute of 1874, Justice Powell basically 
agreed with Justice Stevens' view that section 1983 is limited to reme-
dying violations of federal statutes designed to provide for equal 
rights.U9 Justice White, in his concurring opinion, argued that section 
1983 applies to all rights secured by federal statutes, "unless there is 
clear indication in a particular statute that its remedial provisions arc 
exclusive or that for various other reasons a§ 1983 action is inconsis-
tent with congressional intention."120 
Justice Stewart, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, agreed 
with Justice White regarding the scope of section 1983, but he dissented 
from the majority's holding on federal jurisdiction, contending that 
federal courts have jurisdiction under section 1343(3) to hear any claim 
cognizable under section 1983.121 Justice Stewart also argued that sec-
tion 1983 actions are barred where the federal statute challenged has its 
own enforcement process;122 however, Justices Brennan and Marshall 
did not join this part of his opinion. 
In light of Chapman, it is not surprising that Justices White, Stew-
art, Marshall, and Brennan formed part of the majority in Maine v. 
Thibouto/. 123 Thiboutot held that section 1983 did provide a remedy 
for all state deprivations of rights secured by the Constitution and fed-
eral statutes. 124 It also held that an attorney's fees provision is applica-
ble in statutory section 1983 actions125 and is part of the section 1983 
remedy, whether the action is brought in federal or in stat~ court. 126 
Interestingly, Justices Stevens and Blackmun also voted with the ma-
jority. Of course, since Thiboutot originated in the state courts, the fed-
eral jurisdiction question raised in Chapman was not present. 127 
Further, the state trial court had allowed the action and had ruled 
against the state. 128 Thus, Thiboutot presented no real federalism issue. 
118. Id. 
119. Id. at 627-40 (Powell, J., concurring). 
120. Id. at 672 (White, J., concurring). 
121. Id. (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
122. Id. at 673 n.2. 
123. 448 u.s. 1 (1980). 
124. Id. at 4-8. 
125. Id. at 9. 
126. Id. at 10-11. 
127. Id. at 3. 
128. Id. 
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Perhaps the restrictive interpretation of section 1983 in Chapman by 
Justices Stevens and Blackmun was prompted, at least in part, by feder-
alism concerns. As the Maine Supreme Court pointed out in its 
Thiboutot opinion, allowing concurrent jurisdiction in section 1983 ac-
tions lessens the friction in federal-state relations and is consistent with 
the concepts of federalism expounded in Younger v. Harris. 129 In addi-
tion, although inconsistent with the legislative intent of the 1871 Act, 130 
allowing concurrent jurisdiction provides a vehicle for challenging state 
violations of a federal statute that does not provide a private right of 
action, without increasing the potential caseload of federal courts. 
The dissenters in Thiboutot, Justice Powell, Chief Justice Burger, 
and Justice Rehnquist, disputed the majority's interpretation of the 
"plain" language of section 1983 and once again reviewed the historical 
evidence on the enactment of the legislation, 131 finding that section 
1983 protects only equal rights legislation. They further considered the 
"practical consequences" of the decision-the potential increase in sec-
tion 1983 litigation on both federal and state levels132 and the potential 
federalism problems133-before concluding that the majority decision 
"creates a major new intrusion into state sovereignty under our federal 
system."134 
It appears, then, that concerns about increased litigation and intru-
sions into state sovereignty have influenced at least some Court mem-
bers' treatment of section 1983 actions. Similar concerns, will be 
evident in the Court's treatment of suits brought under section 1985(3). 
A successful argument for expansion of section 1985(3) must therefore 
demonstrate that (1) any federal-state conflicts would be minimal and 
(2) any increase in the caseload of federal courts would be negligible 
and justifiable because no other remedy exists. 
An examination of the four opinions in Novotn)' reveals that the 
majority, Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, Blackmun, and 
Rehnquist, believed that allowing a section 1985(3) action would result 
in some impermissible overlapping with an existing federal statute-
129. 405 A.2d 230, 235 (Me. 1979) (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)). 
130. See, e.g., CoNG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 313 (remarks of Rep. Burchard); 
id. at 485 (remarks of Rep. Cook), 514 (remarks of Rep. Poland), 112 (remarks of Rep. 
Moore). 
131. 448 U.S. at 12-19 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
132. I d. at 22-26. ''No one can predict the extent to which litigation arising from today's 
decision will harass state and local officials; nor can one foresee the number of new filings in 
our already overburdened courts. But no one can doubt that these consequences will be 
substantial." Id. at 23. 
133. Id. at 26-34 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
134. Id. at 33. 
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Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.135 The majority opinion, 
however, was limited to a very narrow issue and avoided addressing 
two important questions: first, whether or not a section 1985(3) action 
would have been allowed had the defendant in Novotny not been sub-
ject to suit under Title VII, and second, whether or not section 1985(3) 
creates a remedy for any federal statutory right. 
Justices Powell and Stevens, who addressed these issues in their 
concurring opinions, concluded that section 1985(3) should be "limited 
to conspiracies to violate those fundamental rights derived from the 
Constitution."136 Justice Stevens suggested that section 1985(3), if con-
stitutionally based on the Thirteenth Amendment, could remedy pri-
vate conspiracies to deprive the litigant of the right to engage in 
interstate travel and the right to be free from badges qf slavery. 137 
Based on his perception of the intent of the 1871 Congress, he added, 
Other privileges and immunities of citizenship such as the 
right to due process oflaw and the right to equal protection of the 
laws are protected by the Constitution only against state ac-
tion. . . . [I]f private persons take conspiratorial action that pre-
vents or hinders the constituted authorities of any State from 
giving or securing equal treatment, . . . the private persons 
would then have violated [§ 1985(3)]. 
If, however, private persons engage in purely private acts of 
discrimination . . . they do not violate the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 138 
Thus, it appears that both Justices Powell and Stevens do not favor an 
expansion of section 1985(3), as it would be extremely difficult to con-
ceive of a case in which a private conspiracy would violate fundamen-
tal constitutional rights since most of these rights do not apply to 
private action. 139 
Justices White, Brennan, and Marshall dissented in Novotny on 
several grounds. 14° First, they argued that section 1985(3) is not a re-
medial statute but is a substantive statute designed to punish the con-
spiracy itself. 141 Second, they contended that any overlap between 
section 1985(3) and Title VII is permissible, since the former merely 
135. See 442 U.S. at 377-78. 
136. Id. at 379 (Powell, J., concurring). 
137. Id. at 381-85 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
138. Id. at 384. 
139. The exceptions are some of the privileges and immunities of citizenship. Id. at 381-
85. 
140. Id. at 385 (White, J., dissenting). 
141. Id. at 388-91. 
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supplements the latter. 142 Finally, they contended that section 1985(3) 
should apply to violations of all rights guaranteed by federal 
statutes. 143 
Thus, three members of the Court strongly favor expansion of sec-
tion 1985(3) to encompass federal statutory rights, and two members 
strongly oppose such expansion. Justice Stewart, the author of the ma-
jority opinions in both Gr!ffin and Novotny, has retired, and Justice 
O'Connor's views are virtually unknown; the attitudes of Chief Justice 
Burger, and of Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist, are therefore pivotal 
in determining the future course of section 1985(3). 
Clearly, since five members of the Court-Chief Justice Burger 
and Justices Powell, Stevens, Blackmun, and Rehnquist-view section 
1985(3) as remedial, it is unlikely that the Court will change this posi-
tion in the near future. Further, the voting pattern of Chief Justice 
Burger and Justice Rehnquist in Chapman and Thiboutot indicates that 
they hold a restrictive view of the post-Civil War civil rights statutes 
and are unlikely to vote in favor of any expansion in scope of section 
1985(3). Justice Blackmun, however, is more of an enigma. He sided 
with the majority in Chapman, Novotny, and Thiboutot. Assuming he 
fully accepted the reasoning of the majority opinion in each of these 
cases, Justice Blackmun might be amenable to some limited expansion 
of the scope of section 1985(3). His position in Chapman as well as in 
Novotny seems to suggest that he is concerned with minimizing over-
lapping remedies on either the state or the federal level. His agreement 
with the majority in Thiboutot, however, suggests that he is only con-
cerned with overlapping remedies when the issue appears at the federal 
level. Thus, it appears that no more than four members of the Court 
might be amenable to some expansion of the scope of section 1985(3), 
while four Justices probably would not favor such an expansion. Jus-
tice O'Connor's vote therefore may be critical to a resolution of this 
question. 
Justice O'Connor's brief tenure as a judge on the Arizona Court of 
Appeals provides little insight into her judicial philosophy.144 In a re-
cent law review article, however, she expressed her concern about the 
increased caseload caused by section 1983 cases and by the failure of 
Congress to limit, either directly or indirectly, the use of section 1983 in 
142. Id. at 391-96. 
143. Id. 
144. Justice O'Connor served approximately one and one-half years on the Arizona 
Court of Appeals. 
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federal courts. 145 She apparently believes that federal court interven-
tion threatens the viability of our bifurcated judicial system. 146 The 
general tenor of the article suggests that federal courts should defer 
more often to state courts in cases involving federal constitutional ques-
tions. 147 If this view is expressed in her decisions as a Supreme Court 
Justice, then it is probable that Justice O'Connor will cast her vote with 
those of the Chief Justice and of Justices Powell, Stevens, and Rehn-
quist, favoring a restrictive scope to section 1985(3). 148 
Conclusion 
It appears that section 1985(3) is doomed to remain a relatively 
obscure remnant of the Reconstruction era, in large part because of a 
conservative Court and an extremely heavy federal caseload. Develop-
ment of section 1985(3) during the less restrictive era of the Warren 
Court was hindered by the requirement of state action imposed by Col-
lins v. Hardyman. By the time this barrier ·was removed in Griffin v. 
Breckenridge, the mood of the Court had changed; efforts to expand 
the scope of section 1985(3) had come too late. Given the atypical facts 
of Novotny and its very narrow holding, there is a remote possibility 
that a majority of the Court might be willing to allow the expansion of 
section 1985(3) in a limited number of cases, particularly those in 
which the claimed injury more closely resembles the type of injuries 
that the drafters of the 1871 Act intended to remedy. Thus, the litigant 
145. O'Connor, Trends in the Relationship Between the Federal and State Courts from the 
Perspective of a State Court Judge, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 801, 810 (1981). Justice 
O'Connor suggested limiting or disallowing attorneys' fees in § 1983 cases as one possible 
way Congress might limit the use of§ 1983. She stated, "Such a move would be welcomed 
by state courts," and also questioned the impact of the Federal Question Jurisdictional 
Amendments Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-486, § 2, 94 Stat. 2369, which eliminated the 
$10,000 amount in controversy requirement for federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 
O'Connor, supra. 
146. Id. at 814-15. 
147. Id. 
148. A recent statement by Justice O'Connor appears to be consistent with the views 
expressed in her law review article. In particular, on March 9, 1982, Justice O'Connor, while 
testifying on the Supreme Court's budget before the United States House of Representatives 
Appropriation Subcommittee, suggested that Congress should enact legislation that would 
limit the number of§ 1983 cases reaching the Court because of its heavy caseload. Justice 
O'Connor Breaks Silence "Rule" in House Testimony, Houston Chron., March 10, 1982, § l, 
at 9. Her statement, when taken in conjunction with the Court's recent decision in Polk 
County v. Dodson, 102 S. Ct. 445 (1981), seems to suggest that absent some binding prece-
dent to the contrary, Justice O'Connor is willing to limit access to the Court by way of 
§ 1983 and, by implication, § 1985(3). In Polk County, the Court held that § 1983 does not 
cover acts by a state-employed public defender because the public defender serves the pub-
lic, not the state, by performing an essentially private function. I d. at 449-50, 453. 
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would probably have to be a member of a class which is subject to 
invidious class-based discrimination-a limiting factor. The most diffi-
cult task facing potential section 1985(3) litigants is to :find some sub-
stantive right, either constitutional or statutory, that can be remedied 
by section 1985(3). Indeed, the extent to which the section can remedy 
statutory rights is still unclear. Nevertheless, it is hoped that Novotny 
will not discourage others from attempting to persuade the Court that 
expansion of section 1985(3) is necessary to insure full civil rights for 
all citizens. 
